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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1956
TORTS
Re Ipsa Loquitur - Right of Control Is Sufficient to Meet the
Requirement of Exclusive Control. The court, in Hogland v. Klein,1
has added one more esoteric refinement to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur." In that case, the respondent was allowed a set-off for damage
to a building in an action by the appellant house-mover for the contract
price for moving the building.3 The court held that the "right of con-
trol" is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of "exclusive control" of
the doctrine.4
The court appeared to accept the appellant's contention that he
did not have actual control of the instrumentality causing the harm.'
It implied, however, that this was of no consequence, because, under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the requirement of control is satisfied
if there is only the "right of control." The court said:
However, the requirement that the offending instrumentality be under
the management and control of the defendant or his servants, does not
mean actual physical control but refers to the right of control at the time
of the accident. Legal control or responsibility for the proper and effi-
cient functioning of the instrumentality which caused the injury and a
1 149 Wash. Dec. 206, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956).
"Res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." Under this doctrine an in-jurious occurrence, of itself, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, affords
reasonable basis for a permissive inference that the harm was caused by the defendant's
want of care.
3 The more extensive facts are as follows: the defendant (respondent) hired the
plaintiff (appellant) to move a building to defendant's property. The plaintiff was to
furnish the equipment but the defendant and his servants were to do all the work in
getting the building ready to move, at which time the plaintiff would do the actual
moving. The plaintiff was to supply his foreman to supervise. The building was cut
into two parts, and the first part successfully moved. The defendant returned the equip-
ment and placed the other half of the house upon the "rig". The plaintiff then pulled
the building only a few feet when the timber supporting it broke, causing damage to
the building for which a set-off was allowed when the plaintiff sued for the contract
price.
4 Morner v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 31 Wn2d 282, 196 P.2d 744 (1948) ; Boyle v.
King County, 46 Wn.2d 428, 282 P.2d 261 (1955) ; Nopson v. Seattle, 33 Wn.2d 772,
207 P.2d 674 (1949) ; Carbery v. Fidelity Savings & Loan Ass'n., 32 Wn2d 391, 201
P.2d 726 (1949) ; Shay v. Parkhurst, 38 Wn.2d 341, 229 P.2d 510 (1951) ; Gardner v.
Seymour, 27 Wn.2d 802, 180 P.2d 564 (1947); Poth v. Dexter Horton Estate, 140
Wash. 272, 248 Pac. 374 (1926) ; Firebaugh v. Seattle Electric Co., 40 Wash. 658, 82
Pac. 995 (1905). See 13 WASH. L. REv. 215 (1938) ; 27 WAsH. L. RFv. 147 (1952).
The requirement of exclusive control does not mean that the plaintiff cannot have
had control of the instrumentality causing harm at any time. Where both parties have
had control jointly, or separately, the doctrine will still be applicable if it is found
that the plaintiff was not negligent during the time he had control. If no negligence is
attributable to the plaintiff's control, then negligence can be inferred from the fact
that the defendant had actual control of the remaining causative factors. Jesionowski
v. Boston & Main Railroad, 329 U.S. 452 (1947); Rocona v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,
173 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1949).
5 The trial court made findings of fact that appellant did have actual physical con-
trol. A close reading of both briefs seems to require the conclusion that there was no
such control at the time the damage occurred. See briefs of appellant and appellee,
Hogland v. Klein, 149 Wash. Dec. 206, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956), Docket No. 33462.
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superior... knowledge of the facts which caused the injury, provide
a sufficient basis for the application of the doctrine (court's emphasis).6
The court felt justice required a finding for the respondent and chose
this interpretation of the requirement of control to accomplish this
result.
It is interesting to note that although there are a great many cases
in this jurisdiction setting out the requirements of res ipsa loquitur7
many of which were cited in the briefs of both parties,' the court, in
arriving at its decision, ignored these cases, and instead cited two de-
cisions from other jurisdictions and secondary authority in support of
its proposition.' In these two cases, and in cases cited by the secondary
material in support of the proposition, it can be noted that there has
been a loose use of the term "right of control." In each of these cases,
the defendant had, in fact, actual control shortly before the accident.
It appears that the courts were confusing the term "right of control"
used in a legal sense, with what might be termed "crucial control",
meaning control at the time at which, according to the inference drawn
from the accident, the negligence in fact occurred.
The term "right of control," as used in the cited cases is not appli-
cable to the present case. Since the trial court made no finding of neg-
ligence in supplying defective material, the negligence, if any, causing
the accident took place somewhere between the time the respondent
received the materials and the time of the accident. Both the appel-
lant and the respondent had joint control of the equipment at the time
the first half of the building was moved. The trial court might have
resolved the factual disputes with a finding that the respondent was
not negligent in the control he exercised. The doctrine then would
have allowed the inference that the defendant was negligent in his
control of the remaining causative factors."0 However, the inference
would be, and it seems was, rebutted by the fact that the first effort
was successful. At least, no explanation was given of why, if appellant
had been negligent, his negligence did not cause an injury during the
first moving operation. Therefore, the negligence, if any, must have
occurred, as the court apparently believed, after the appellant had
6 149 Wash. Dec. at 208, 298 P2d at 1101.
See Note 4, supra.
8 Briefs of appellant and appellee, Hogland v. Klein, Note 1, supra, Docket No.
33462.
9 Taylor v. Reading Co., 83 F. Supp. 804 (E. D. Penn. 1949) ; Oldis v. La Societe
Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 130 Cal.App.2d 461, 279 P.2d 184 (1955); 65
CJ.S., Negligence § 220 (8) (1950); 38 Am. Jur., Negligence § 300 (1941).
10 See Note 4, supra.
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relinquished all physical control. The appellant could not have had
the "crucial control" outlined by the cited authorities because he had
no control at all at the time the negligence must have taken place.
It is submitted that had the court followed the decision and rationale
of Morner v. Union Pacific R. R. Co.," and later cases citing and sup-
porting that decision, 2 an opposite result might have been reached.
The Morner case pointed out that one of the major reasons for having
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the law is that the defendant, who
has exclusive control over the instrumentality causing the harm, is in a
better position to explain the accident than is the plaintiff. However,
a defendant who has only a "right of control," but not actual control,
certainly is in no better position to explain the cause of an accident
than is the plaintiff, particularly in a case where the plaintiff was the
one with actual control. It is also apparent that there is nothing from
which negligence may be inferred as a matter of common sense reason-
ing simply because a defendant has the "right of control," if he in fact
does not have control, or a duty to exercise control."
This writer has not found a single case in this jurisdiction in which
the court has recognized the definition of the term "exclusive control"
which it advanced in the instant case. Apparently the court was like-
wise unable to find such a precedent since it resorted only to cases from
other jurisdictions and secondary authority. The refinement added to
the definition of exclusive control not only gives the word "exclusive"
a novel and self-contradictory meaning, but adds confusion to an
already thoroughly confused idea and takes the "doctrine" of res ipsa
loquitur further away from what, in the beginning, was a common
sense proposition of inferring negligence from a given set of facts on
the basis of everyday experience.
ALLEN L. CARP
1131 Wn.2d 282, 196 P2d 744 (1948).
12 Carbery v. Fidelity Savings & Loan Ass'n., 32 Wn.2d 391, 201 P2d 726 (1949);
Nopson v. Seattle, 33 Wn.2d 772, 207 P.2d 674 (1949) ; Shay v. Parkhurst, 38 Wn. 2d
341, 229 P. 2d 510 (1951); Emerick v. Mayr, 39 Wn.2d 23 234 P.2d 1079 (1951).
See Wydenes v. Dykstra, 39 Wn.2d 756, 238 P.2d 1198 (19515. Cf. Nopson v. Wock-
ner, 40 Wn.2d 645, 245 P.2d 1022 (1952); Covey v. Western Tank Lines, 36 Wn.2d
381, 218 P.2d 322 (1950). Also see 13 WASH. L. R v. 215 (1938) ; 27 WASH. L. R v.
147 (1952) ; Appellant's brief, Docket No. 33462 (1956).
13 Actually, the requirement of superior knowledge and explanation is in itself an
extension of the "doctrine". Originally, res ipsa loquitur meant only that where an
accident happens which, based upon human experience, ordinarily does not happen
except for negligence, then negligence can be inferred. See PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (2nd
ed. 1955). 3 HI-Au, & JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 19.9 (1956). However, it is the




Negligence: Signal-Controlled Intersections-Automobile Legally in Intersection
Has Reasonable Time to Clear. In Lanagan v'. Crawford, 149 Wash. Dec. 539, 304
P.2d 953 (1956), plaintiff sued for personal injures when his car was involved in a
collision with defendant's car. The jury found that plaintiff had entered the inter-
section on a green light but had been held up while still in the intersection by traffic
which was making a left hand turn. The jury further found that the defendant had
entered the intersection when the light turned green in his favor and had struck the
plaintiff's car while it was still there. Both cars were apparently legally in the inter-
section. A verdict was returned for the plaintiff which was vacated upon motion of the
defendant and a judgment n.o.v. was granted in his favor. The judgment n.o.v. was
granted on the basis of a holding in Rockey v. Glacier Gravel Co., 34 Vn.2d 492, 209
P.2d 291 (1949), in which case a motorist, who made a left hand turn in front of the
plaintiff who had entered with the green light in his favor, was found guilty of negli-
gence. Held, reversed. The Court distinguished the Glacier case, supra, on its facts
and, relying partially upon RCW 46.60.230, a "right of way" statute, held that vehicles
legally in a light-controlled intersection have a reasonable opportunity to clear the
intersection. Regardless of the fact that a motorist might enter the intersection under
the protection of the green light, he is under a duty to observe traffic conditions and
the failure to observe existing conditions and take necessary precautions is negligence.
This case represents the first time this precise issue has been considered by the court.
It curtails the concept that the motorist in whose favor the light is green has an
absolute right to the intersection.
Negligence-Contributory Negligence-Presumption of Due Care. Mills v. Pacific
County, 48 Wn.2d 211, 292 P.2d 362 (1956), was an action for the wrongful death of
a motorist who was killed when his car went off a negligently maintained county
bridge. There were no witnesses, but circumstantial evidence indicated contributory
negligence upon the part of the decedent. The trial court gave judgment for the
defendant. The appellant argued, inter alia, that circumstantial evidence may not be
used to overcome the presumption that the decedent was exercising due care for his
own safety; and that consequently the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from
the evidence was that the accident was caused by the defective condition of the bridge.
Held, judgment affirmed. There is no presumption of due care on the part of the
decedent, and circumstantial evidence adequately established his contributory negli-
gence. The court relied upon the decision in Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wn2d 780, 252 P2d
581 (1953), which held that since the burden of proving contributory negligence is
on the defendant, there is no need for a presumption of due care on the part of the
decedent. That case expressly overruled the case of Morris v. Chicago, ML, St. P. &
Pac. R. Co., 1 Wn.2d 587, 97 P.2d 119 (1939), insofar as it held that under certain
circumstances, the presumption of due care should be submitted to the jury. See
Comment, 29 WAsH. L. REv. 79 (1954).
TRUSTS
Testamentary Trusts-Violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities
-Effect of Saving Clause. The recent case of In re Lee's Estate'
involved a testamentary trust which the Washington Court upheld
solely by reason of a saving clause in the will creating the trust, when
otherwise the trust would have failed since the limitations disposing
1 149 Wash. Dec. 247, 299 P.2d 1066 (1956).
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